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Energy Trade and the National
Security Exception to the GATT
By Donald N Zillman*
Three topics combine in this paper: international trade, national security,
and energy. The specific focus of the paper is the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the "essential security interests" exception
contained in Article XXI. The provisions of the GATT set out the structure
of a system to encourage international trade by reducing tariffs and other
trade barriers.
More broadly, many aspects of international trade in energy have devel
oped outside the structure of GATT or with the implied assumption that
Article XXI or another GATT exception would take them out of normal
GATT arrangements. National security matters have often played a role in
energy law and policy in a way that overrides free trade objectives.
Nonetheless, several recent treaties and decisions have imposed free trade
goals to override national security claims involving energy trade.
This article examines Article XXI and its application. The law of Article
XXI has been created by non-energy trade. We then turn to energy trade.
Using United States law as an example, we examine some of the areas in
which alleged national security reasons have set a policy other than the full
working of an international free market. We conclude with a look at the
changing meaning of national security in the post-Cold War world.

GAIT national security exception
Article XXI defines one limitation on the application of GATT. In essence,
Article XXI suggests that other values may supplant the goals of trade
liberalisation. In its entirety the article reads:
"Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests:
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which
they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
• Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
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war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursu
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security."
Subsection (a) has been characterised by one recent commentator as
allowing abstention from action. 1 The provision leaves the decision as to
what are "essential security interests" to the nation asserting the claim. The
obvious categories involve military weaponry and plans. In the late 1940s
when the provision was drafted, atomic technology was the most visible
example. The provision appears to have excited little contention in the half
century since.
Subsection (b) allows actions contrary to GAIT's trade liberalisation
goals. 2 A nation can claim that an obligation under GATT can be ignored
because of"essential security interests". Again, the language of the provision
indicates that nations are able to decide for themselves ("taking any action
it considers necessary") as to what matters fit within the exception. The
three subsections appear to move from the specific to the general. Subsection
(i)'s coverage of fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived was directed at the most significant military weaponry in any
country's arsenal. Recall that until the mid-1950s there was little peaceful
use of the atom. The nuclear electric generating industry came after the
drafting of GATT Article XXI. Subsection (ii) involves traffic in arms,
ammunition, and "other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment". Here the
range of products is far wider. The supplies to run a modem military organis
ation touch a vast range of manufacturing establishments. Nonetheless, the
"purpose of supplying a military establishment" provides some limit to the
provision. Subsection (iii) is the most troubling and open-ended provision.
"Any action . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations" is so broad as to allow almost any measure as an exception to
the GATT. If the definition is left to the nation asserting the exception,
nothing may be outside the language. "Time of war" is at least definable
by events other than a nation's desire to avoid a GATT responsibility.
"Other emergency in international relations" lacks that specificity.
Subsection (c) has also been of little consequence. It provides that the
UN Treaty obligations involving peace and security are superior to conflict
ing GATT obligations. Quite likely, any matters arising under United
Nations Charter obligations could also be justified under the "time of war
or other emergency in international relations" language of (b )(iii).
Scholarly commentators have been troubled by the open-endedness of the

1

Michael Hahn, "Vital Interests and the Law of GAIT: An Analysis of GAIT's Security
Exception", 12 Mich J Int L 558, 579 (1991) (Hahn).
2
Hahn at 579.
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national security exceptions. 3 They have argued for a legal rule that Article
XXI does not give carte blanche to a state to justify any breach of the GAIT
based on security grounds. Their discomfort may be both that the provision
"brings the politics of international disputes into the legal world of trade
and business" 4 and that it clearly suggests that international politics trumps
matters commercial. An author has expressed concern that Article XXI
"would allow the exception to emasculate the rule of liberal trade orders". 5
Another author observes that GATT contracting parties tend to declare
Article XXI as "an unqualified escape clause" but in practice it has been
applied "only in reaction to what was perceived to be an internationally
wrongful act". 6 A half dozen actual disputes over 40 years put Article XXI
in context. 7
1949 United States v Czechoslovakia The dispute followed shortly after
the drafting of the GATT and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia.
The United States imposed export control licences to prevent the shipment
of goods to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs contended that the United States
had violated the GAIT. The United States defended in part on the exception
provided in Article XXI. The United States took the position that Article
XXI gave it wide scope to define matters within its national security needs.
The Czechs argued for a narrower exception. The United States argued to
the Contracting Parties that "every country must have the last resort relating
to its own security". The Contracting Parties rejected the Czech complaint.
Mr Hahn's summary of the dispute suggests he was less disturbed by the
decision on the merits than by the expansive United States position that
suggested a nation might define almost anything as related to national secur
ity.8 He argues that the matters identified in subsections {i), (ii), and (iii)
of subsection (b) encompass the range of matters which may be asserted
under a Section XXI claim.
1961 Ghana v Portugal Ghana, one of the first of the independent black
nations of Africa, restricted trade with Portugal by banning certain
Portuguese products. The Ghanaian representative stated: "It might be
observed that a country's security interests may be threatened by a potential
as well as an actual danger. The Ghanaian Government's view was that the
situation in [Portuguese colony] Angola was a constant threat to the peace
of the African continent and that any action which, by bringing pressure to
bear on the Portuguese Government, might lead to a lessening of this danger,
was therefore justified in the essential security interests of Ghana". 9 Ghana
also asserted the position that each nation was the "sole judge" of its essen
tial security interests under GATT Article XXI.
3

See Hahn; Note, "The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute
Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defence in the Context of the US Embargo of Nicaragua",
19 Law and Policy in International Business 603 (1987) (Politics of Procedure); David Knoll,
"The Impact of Security Concerns Upon International Economic Law", II Syracuse Journal
of International Law and Commerce 567 (1984) (Knoll).
4
Hahn at 580.
5
Knoll at 587.
6
Hahn at 569.
7
They are usefully summarised in Michael Hahn's article in the Michigan Journal of
International Law and in a Note in Law & Policy in International Business. I borrow liberally
from the authors' summaries. See notes I and 3.
8
Hahn at 569-70.
9
Summary Record of the Twelfth Session Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneve, GATT
Doc SR. 19/12 at 196 (1961 ).
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1974 Germany v Iceland The German Government and the govern
ments of four German coastal states banned the landing of fresh fish from
Icelandic trawlers. Iceland claimed Germany had violated the GATT.
Germany responded that Iceland had violated international law in its unilat
eral extension of its fishing zone to the disadvantage of German and other
nations' fishing fleets. Backed by a favourable opinion from the International
Court of Justice, Germany asserted that its act was a legitimate countermeas
ure. Iceland responded that even if its action were illegal under international
law, that did not provide a basis for Germany to violate the GATT. Germany
retorted that a legally justified countermeasure under international law could
not be illegal under the GATT. The German argument continued: "[t)he
General Agreement did not represent an isolated legal system. Rather, it
was embedded in the general rules of international law. Otherwise, any State
could constantly violate the economic interests of its neighbouring State
which would be forced to renounce any countermeasure it wanted to take".10
Hahn notes his surprise that Germany declined to accept the application of
the GATT rules "to a highly political dispute, thus even refusing to use the
possibilities offered by article XXI" Y
1975 Sweden In November 1975 Sweden introduced a quota on certain
footwear. Sweden cited what commentators refer to as the "spirit of Article
XXI" in its defence. 12 Sweden noted that "the decrease in domestic pro
duction has become a threat to the planning of Sweden's economic defence
in situations of emergency as an integral part of its security policy. This
policy required the maintenance of a minimum domestic production capacity
in vital industries"Y The Swedish position was greeted with widespread
skepticism. It was terminated by unilateral Swedish action 18 months later.
Hahn distinguished this case as the baldest assertion of "economic" as con
trasted to "political" reasons. 14 He suggests, without further elaboration,
that the Swedish dispute raises the question of whether other GATT escape
clauses (for example, Article XIX with its more stringent requirements) limit
the scope of Article XXI.
1982 European Community, Australia, and Canada v Argentina In
response to the Argentine seizure of control in the Falklands (Malvinas),
Community and Commonwealth nations suspended imports from
Argentina. The suspending nations asserted their rights under UN Security
Council Resolution and "on the basis of their inherent rights of which Article
XXI . . . is a reflection ... ". Hahn again notes the reluctance to base the
claim directly on the GATT. 15 Several nations among the Contracting
Parties criticised the reliance on unspecified inherent rights rather than pre
cise provisions of Article XXI. The suspending nations argued that the
GATT was the wrong forum to be resolving a major military-political issue.
A statement of the Contracting Parties appeared to recognise merit in both

10
GAIT Council, Minutes of Meeting held 18 February 1975, GAIT Doc CJM/103 (18
February 1975) at 16.
11
Hahn at 573.
12
Politics of Procedure at 619.
13
Minutes of Meeting Held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 31 October 1975, GAIT
Doc C/M/109, at 9 (1975).
14
Hahn at 578.
15
Hahn at 574.
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positions and, in Hahn's phrase, left "almost everything as obscure as it was
before".16
1985 United States v Nicaragua United States relations with the
Sandanista regime in Nicaragua festered throughout the 1980s. Initial trade
restrictions by the United States were not justified under any exceptions to
the GATT. On 1 May 1985, President Reagan issued an Executive Order
that declared actions of the Nicaraguan Government to constitute "an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States" _17 The order declared "a national emergency to deal
with that threat". The President prohibited imports and exports from
Nicaragua. Nicaragua claimed a violation of the GATT.
The United States declaration was greeted with considerable skepticism
in the world of GATT. The United States response was seen as excessive in
the particular circumstances and wrong in asserting the unilateral right to
determine national security exceptions. Even parts of the United States busi
ness community were opposed to the United States position. 18
Eventually Nicaragua secured reference of the dispute to a Panel created
by the GATT Council. However, the Panel's power was constrained con
siderably by the agreement that it could not consider the validity of the
United States' invocation of Article XXI(b )(iii). The Panel eventually
reported to the Council on 5 November 1986. It did express criticism of the
United States embargo noting that it flew in the face of GAIT's goal of
promoting free trade. In guarded terms, the Panel also suggested that the
United States had wrongly balanced its national security interests against
the need for stability and growth in international trade. However, even the
opponents of the United States position on policy grounds seemed to con
cede that the United States had the right to impose the embargo under
existing law. The Council concluded by asking further study of the scope
of the national security exception. It proposed two options to resolve the
embargo. Either the United States could end the embargo or Nicaragua
could retaliate. The Contracting Parties did not accept the Report due to
United States opposition. In 1990, after the electoral defeat of the Sandanista
government, the United States lifted its embargo.
Energy and national security

The ideal world of GATT envisions free movement of goods and services
among nations. Tariffs are low or nonexistent. Other laws and customs do
not hinder the movement of goods and services. In theory the commodities
and services that compose energy could operate in that fashion. In practice,
they have not. Even in the United States, with its considerable dedication
to the 'free market' and its distrust of public ownership, government regu
lation or involvement has characterised segments of the energy sector. Often
national security reasons explain the deviation from free market and free
trade goals. Some of these national security justifications fit within the lan
guage of GATT Article XXI. Others go well beyond it. In both cases, analy
sis of law and policy suggest that national security reasons may be only a

16

17
18

Hahn at 575.
Executive Order 12513 of I May 1985.
See Beacon Products Corp v Reagan, 814 F 2d I (I Cir 1987).
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part of the explanation for the trade restraint. Three aspects of United States
energy law illustrate national security restraints on trade.
Petroleum import-export controls

The crucial nature of petroleum in running a modem armed force has been
visible in several government actions limiting open trade in petroleum. The
Mandatory Oil Imports Programme from 1959 to 1973 sought to limit the
amount of low cost foreign oil that reached the United States. 19 The pro
gramme was justified on questionable national security grounds. Excessive
foreign imports could make the United States hostage to the demands of
politically unpredictable foreign suppliers. The cheap foreign oil could also
destroy parts of the domestic oil industry. In consequence the United States
bought far less Middle Eastern oil than it could have purchased in a market
free of government control at pre-1973 embargo prices.
The United States has also imposed export controls on petroleum. A
notable example was the ban of exports on Alaskan oil after the Prudhoe
Bay discoveries of the 1960s. Current law forbids the export of crude oil
transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline subject to Presidentially
initiated exceptions. 20 The statute reflects a mix of national security (the
need to preserve a scarce resource for essential purposes), political, and
environmental reasons. 21
These petroleum policies are the product of unilateral action by the United
States. Federal statute also supports United States participation in the
International Energy Agreement. This Agreement codifies the determination
of the major industrial nations to deal with a repetition of the oil producers'
boycott of 1973. 22
Network bound export-import controls

Cross border trade in natural gas and electricity has the potential to be a
major contributor to energy needs. Federal regulation of both natural gas
under the Natural Gas Act and electricity under the Federal Power Act
includes such transnational regulation. 23 A federal licence issued by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is needed for exports. National
security considerations are a rather small factor in permitting product move
ment among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Securing uninterrupted
energy supplies from Canada was a major United States objective in nego
tiations leading to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Article
907 of the Agreement limits the availability of the national security
exception.
National security was the major factor in the Reagan Administration's
attempt to impede construction of the natural gas pipeline from the Soviet

19

Presidential Proclamation No 3279, 12 March 1959.
50 USC App 2406(d).
21
Having won a bitter political fight to build the 800 mile pipeline through environmentally
sensitive terrain, the government could not afford the perception that the oil was supplying
foreign markets objectives.
22
42 USC 850 I. The President is given power to take actions when he finds "with respect
to any energy sources for which [he] determines a severe energy supply interruption exists or
is inuninent or that actions to restrain domestic energy demands are required in order to fulfill
the obligations of the United States under the international energy programme".
22
15 USC 717b (natural gas); 16 USC 824a(e) (export of electricity).
20
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Union to Western Europe in the early 1980s. 24 The national security con
cerns ranged from Soviet access to militarily useful technology to strengthen
ing of the Soviet economy through the infusion of hard currency from the
gas sales to the potential for a Soviet political embargo of a crucial energy
resource. Eventually, the United States gave up its effort to stop the project
having harmed primarily its own manufacturers.
Nuclear energy

Nuclear power has always been a special case. Even the most devoted free
marketeers and free traders hesitate at the prospect of uncontrolled nuclear
commercial activity. The United States Atomic Energy Act reflects the deli
cate balances among military and peaceful uses and promotion and protec
tions. The statute's Declaration of Policy observes that atomic energy "shall
be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare,
subject at all times to the permanent objective of making the maximum
contribution to the common defence and security". 25 Likewise, the statute
encourages the international peaceful use of the atom "to make available
to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy
as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common
defence and security will permit". 26
Further sections of the Act forbid issuing commercial nuclear licences to
an "alien or foreign controlled corporation" 27 and prohibit various activity
if it is "inimical to the common defence and security". 28 International
exports are subject to provisions of legislation discouraging proliferation of
materials useful in the making of nuclear weapons. 29
The recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 1992 sheds light on current
Congressional thinking on energy, trade, and national security. 30 The House
Report on the Act describes a "comprehensive national energy policy that
gradually and steadily increases US energy security in cost-effective and
environmentally beneficial ways'? 1 Among its goals are the reduction of
petroleum imports, 32 an increase in the size of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve 33 and the encouragement of nuclear electric power through such
programmes as more expeditious nuclear plant licensing, 34 resolution of the
site for long-term nuclear waste disposal, 35 and creation of a new private
sector-based nuclear fuel enrichment corporation. 36

24

See Public Papers of President Ronald Reagan 1982 at 831-32.
42 usc 2011.
26
42 USC 2013(c).
27
42 usc 2133.
28
See eg, 42 USC 2074(b) (plutonium distribution); 2112(b) (foreign distribution of byproducts material); 2133 (commercial licences).
29
42 USC 2153; see generally, Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-242.
30
Public Law 102-486, Energy Policy Act of 1992.
31
House Report No 102-1018, 1992 US Code Cong & Admin News 1953, 1955.
32
Public Law 102-486, Title XX.
33
Id, Title XN.
34
Id, Title XXVIII.
35
Id, Title VIII.
36
Id, Title IX.
25
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Evolving meanings of national security

For half a century from 1940 to 1990 "essential security interests" centered
on the use of military force to preserve national sovereignty, if not the nation
itself. The World War II attempts at military domination by Japan and
Germany were followed by the Soviet Union's imposition of military control
over Eastern Europe and the worldwide competition between the
Communist and capitalist blocs. From approximately 1947 to 1989 two
threats dominated national security planning by the Western nations. The
first was the risk of massive nuclear war brought about by design or accident.
The United States and the Soviet Union built enormous nuclear arsenals
targeted at both military and civilian targets. While opinions differed as to
how bad the "worst case" nuclear exchange might be, no serious analyst
doubted that a major exchange of nuclear weapons by the superpowers
could work the largest destruction of any conflict in human history. The
second threat was the conventional military assault on Western Europe. The
prime scenario for ground combat for NATO forces was a massive Russian
atta~k through the Fulda Gap in Germany with the goal of military and
political domination of all of Europe. This threat compelled the positioning
of 300,000 United States troops in Europe (primarily West Germany) for
almost half a century.
These two events helped define other United States assertions of security
interests over the last half century. Only the worldwide struggle against
Communism explains the massive American interventions in Korea in
1950-53 and in Vietnam from approximately 1961 to 1973. It explains the
crises-short-of-war exemplified by threats to Berlin in 1948 and 1961 and,
most memorably, the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. It also explains the
various small wars (Grenada in 1983) and covert actions (CIA involvement
against the Mossadegh Government in Iran in 1954 and destabilisation of
the left-leaning regimes in Guatemala in the 1950s, Chile in the 1970s, and
Nicaragua in the 1980s).
National security policies involving nuclear weapons sought equivalence,
if not superiority, over the other super-power with considerable attention
given to the alternative means of delivery (the nuclear triad of bombers,
ballistic missiles, and submarine launched missiles) and sought to discourage
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. Efforts by the super
powers to limit the number and potency of nuclear weapons were largely
unsuccessful for most of the Cold War.
The events of 1989-91 changed the Western definitions of "essential secur
ity interests". By conventional definitions the NATO alliance "won" the 50
year struggle. It is worth recalling that few Western leaders of the mid-1980s
could have anticipated so total a victory. By the standards of 1985, Western
leadership would probably have conceded Communist domination of
Eastern Europe and parts of the third world, Soviet military equivalency,
and the perpetual continuation of Communism in return for an agreement
that would have reduced the tensions and economic burdens of the warfare
society. By 1993 far more had been achieved. Eastern Europe had achieved
independence. The Soviet Union itself had fractured. Communism as a gov
erning ideology had virtually collapsed. The Russian military threat had
receded and Communist regimes elsewhere (Cuba, North Korea) appeared
economic basket cases and ideological anachronisms. All in a span of five
years.
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The half century of conflict has left its legacy in the United States and
elsewhere. Although popular enthusiasm varied, the United States asserted
"essential security interests" to justify a wide variety of Government actions.
A hardly inclusive list could include elaborate programmes controlling
government employee loyalty, various controls on product imports and
exports, national defence educational programmes and highway systems, a
covert national security apparatus, and the direct military expenditures on
a "second to none" nuclear force and a conventional military with worldwide
projection abilities. The last was designed to have the capacity to fight a
minimum of one and a half wars at the same time - resisting a Russian
assault in Europe and fighting a smaller war (possibly Soviet inspired) else
where in the world. National security took on an expansive meaning and
one that was often asserted to override other values and normal consti
tutional processes.
The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet nuclear threat has
not ended United States concerns about national security. In the narrowly
military sense, the world remains a dangerous place at least as far as
American interests are defined. We can identify a half dozen likely justifi
cations for the use of force:
( 1) As operation Desert Storm has shown, the United States and much
of the developed world regard a plentiful and stable flow of oil from
the Middle East as a paramount national interest. The region's con
tinued instability makes possible the prospect of further military
actions to secure resource access.
(2) The continuation of Arab-Israeli tensions (though lessened by the
Israeli-PLO agreements) adds to the Middle Eastern tensions. For
the United States and for much of Europe the survival of the Israeli
democracy is an imperative to be defended with the use of military
force. No other country that faces a plausible threat to its national
integrity calls up such a degree of support.
(3) The nuclear concern continues. Today any Russian or United States
nuclear attack probably would be accidental rather than a conscious
choice of national military strategy. The greater concern may shift
to newer members of the nuclear club. Israel-Iraq, North Korea
South Korea and Pakistan-India all offer the realistic possibility of
a nuclear attack. Clearly, the developed world has strong incentives
to prevent such an exchange. What is less clear is the Western reaction
if the exchange should take place.
(4) Threats of major cross border wars continue. Some may have as their
objective the virtual annihilation of the losing state. Others may seek
more narrow territorial, resource, or political objectives. Again, the
range of major power concern varies.
(5) Numerous nations are threatened with disintegration on the basis of
religious or ethnic identity. Russia and Yugoslavia are the most visible
recent cases.
(6) Humanitarian activity requiring military involvement may be gaining
popularity. The Somalian intervention is the recent example. Law
and the media combine to encourage humanitarian activity. Law has
gradually eroded the assumption that a national leadership might
treat its citizens (including the ethnic or religious minorities) however
it wanted. Worldwide media coverage can force human rights viol
ations on the public conscience in a way never before possible.
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All of these examples suggest that major powers will continue to keep

and use military force. A literal definition of an "essential security interest"
may rule out certain of these actions as grounds for GAIT obligations. Is
the Somali intervention truly "essential" to the security of the United States
if that term means the continuation of the United States as a political and
economic entity? Most certainly not. However, a half century of exaggerat
ing national security threats may leave some hard habits to break. As the
GAIT disputes over Article XXI suggest "essential security interests"
remain in the eye of the beholder.
A second issue involves the extension of "essential security interests"
beyond the purely military. Historian Paul Kennedy has addressed the point
well. "[T]he definition of national security cannot refer simply to military
policies or to military spending alone. I think it ought to refer instead to
those sources, those underpinnings of long-term national strength in the
state and power of our manufacturing, investment in science and technology,
of educational skills, all of which ultimately the Armed Forces and defence
policy of this country have to rest upon" .37 Article XXI itself is a mix of
references to the narrowly military (eg "traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war ... ") and the more expansive ("fissionable materials",
measures taken "in time of ... other emergency in international relations").
Over the last decade political discourse in the United States has defined
"essential security" to include matters beyond purely military threats. The
January 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States identifies four
"national interests". The first is the predictable: "The survival of the United
States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact
and its institutions and people secure". The second is less obviously a justifi
cation for armed force: "A healthy and growing US economy to ensure
opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavours
at home and abroad". Its subhead is to: "Ensure access to foreign markets,
energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space". 38 The two most visible
American examples would be the national economic decline and the threats
to the environment. Neither the world in which the United States has lost
its industrial competitiveness nor the one spoiled by pollution is a secure
world. The damage to the structure of society from these harms is seen by
some to be every bit as great as from a military defeat of all but the most
cataclysmic type. This interpretation of "essential security" could justify
almost any trade restriction under GAIT Article XXI.
Conclusion
Energy trade has been something of a special case. The importance of the
energy product to buyer (securing an essential military or economic resource)
and seller (sometimes securing a major portion of export earnings) has pro
vided an incentive that has allowed trade to take place. At the same time

37

American Economic Power: Redefining National Security for the 1990s, Hearings before
the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, lOist Cong, 1st Sess, 9 November 1989 at 23.
38
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992 at 5.
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national security factors have intruded where domestic interests are threat
ened by unrestricted trade.
The end of the Cold War lessens but does not end national security claims.
It surely expands the prospects for energy trade worldwide. But, such trade
may now be more subject to the lengthy negotiations and cumbersome
obstacles common to trade in "less strategic" commodities.
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